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State Legislators, Speech or Debate, and the Search
for Truth
GARY L. STARKMAN*
INTRODUCTION
State legislatures are viewed with mixed emotions in this country.
Their members are considered in some quarters to be out of touch
with their constituencies; yet the vast number of controversial is-
sues which legislators must address will inevitably produce a variety
of positions that some, or even a majority, of their constituents will
find objectionable. The procedures under which legislatures operate
are often viewed as labyrinthian and enigmatic; but, for the most
part, they are designed to assure that the subjects addressed by
legislation are given fair and equal consideration. The legislative
pr6cess itself is criticized as too "political", as if the very word
carried some nefarious connotation; but politics is essential to a
functioning democracy.
Thus, we are left with a divergence of opinion on the strength and
independence of state legislatures. On one end of the spectrum are
those who subscribe to the notion that "[n]o man's life, liberty or
property are safe while the Legislature is in session."' On the other
end are those who concur with Justice Holmes' observation "that
legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the courts."'
In the last few years, this divergence has subtly entered the adju-
dicatory process. Because the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution protects members of Congress from the con-
sequences of their "official" acts,3 an official act of a member clearly
may not be used as evidence against him.4 Equally certain is the
* Counsel to the Governor of Illinois, A.B. University of Illinois; J.D. cum laude Northwest-
ern University School of Law; Co-author, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(Foundation Press 1974). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not
intended to reflect an official position.
1. The Final Accounting in the Estate of A.B., 1 Tucker (N.Y. Surrogate Rep.) 247, 249
(1866).
2. Missouri, K. & J. RR. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
3. "The Senators and Representatives ... for any Speech or Debate in either House...
shall not be questioned in any other place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. "Like much other
Constitutional language, this has been found to say a great deal in very little, and at the same
time its meaning has yet to be fully explored." United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 805
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
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corresponding immunity, established by forty-three state constitu-
tions, which prevents the admission of official acts as evidence
against state legislators brought to trial in state courts. However,
the question of whether evidence of a state legislator's official activ-
ity may be used against him in a federal criminal prosecution has
produced an exact split among the twenty-two federal judges who
have considered the issue in four recent cases.6
The dynamics that gave rise to the issues in each of these cases
reveal that the ultimate answer to the privilege question generally
was based upon the particular judge's perception of the legislative
process. Accordingly, the divergence of opinion on state legislatures
has some very real consequences in the context of a federal criminal
trial.
This article proposes that evidence of official activity should be
admitted in the federal-criminal prosecution of a state legislator.
The article will reach this conclusion, first by a determination that
federal evidentiary standards rather than state or federal constitu-
tional principles control the analysis. The common law underpin-
nings of the speech or debate privilege as they should be interpreted
in light of reason and experience will then be examined. The under-
lying considerations of separation of powers, need for legislative
debate, judicial deference to legislative motives and the principles
383 U.S. 169 (1966); United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 823 (1974).
5. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. V, § 16; IM. CONST. art. 4, § 12; MD. CONST. art. III, § 18;
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 13.
6. See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S.
- (1979); United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
924 (1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Craig,
537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976),
adopting concurring opinion in United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 973 (1976).
Of the twenty-two federal judges who have reviewed the issue on the district and circuit
court levels, eleven have found that state legislators enjoy a speech or debate privilege against
the introduction of such evidence, and eleven have found no privilege to exist. In GiUock,
Chief Judge Bailey (W.D. Tenn.) and Judges Edwards and Engel upheld the privilege; Judge
Weick dissented. In re Grand Jury Proceedings disclosed the same division on the issue: Judge
Becker (E.D. Pa.) and Judges Seitz and Weis recognized the privilege; Judge Gibbons did
not. In United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978), the only decision in the group rendered after a trial on the merits, all four judges
declined to recognize the privilege: Judges Skinner (D. Mass.) and the reviewing panel com-
posed of Judges Coffin, Aldrich, and Crary (C.D. Cal., sitting by designation). In Craig, the
en banc Seventh Circuit opinion reviewed a decision of Judge Kirkland (N.D. Ill.) which
upheld the privilege. Judges Pell, Sprecher, Tone, Bauer, and Wood concluded that no
privilege existed; Judges Cummings, Fairchild, and Swygert found otherwise. Judge Kunzig
of the Court of Claims, who sat by designation on the original Craig panel but not the
rehearing, also recognized the privilege.
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of federalism will be assessed. Finally, the article will focus upon the
modern legislative process as a basis for rejection of the speech or
debate privilege.
THE CASES: DISCORD AMONG THE COURTS
In United States v. Craig,7 the first case to consider the question
of a state legislator's speech or debate privilege, three Illinois legis-
lators were indicted for extorting $1500 from an automotive leasing
association to block passage of a bill. One defendant moved to sup-
press his grand jury testimony and statements to governmental
agents during two interviews. The district court, in an unreported
opinion, held that the speech or debate clause of the Illinois Consti-
tution required the suppression of various portions of defendant's
statements.
On the government's appeal from the suppression order, a major-
ity of the Seventh Circuit panel took a different approach. The court
held that the admission of evidence in a federal criminal trial was
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, not state law, and
traced the development of the privilege section of the Rules. It con-
cluded that the analytical framework imposed by the Rules required
a determination of whether the principles of common law, as inter-
preted in light of reason and experience, dictated recognition of a
speech or debate privilege to be applied in federal prosecutions of
state legislators. 8
The majority focused on the role that the Founders intended the
states to play in our dual sovereignty constitutional structure, and
with heavy reliance on the ratification debates,' found that state
legislatures acting within the scope of their powers perform a func-
tion as vital to governing the state as the role Congress fulfills with
regard to the nation as a whole. 0 From this premise, Judge Cum-
mings' opinion concluded that the privilege should be recognized
because a legislator must not be influenced by the threat of prosecu-
tion by a hostile executive when considering whether to support or
oppose a proposed law. This is true whether the threat emanates
from a state or federal executive."
7. 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
8. 528 F.2d at 776.
9. "The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of State governments,
• . . leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign
power." The Federalist (No. 9) 76 (New American Library ed. 1961). See also Hl Elliot's
Debates 168, 199, 308 (1836 ed.)(Massachusetts; Connecticut; New York).
10. 528 F. 2d at 778.
11. Id. at 778-79. The opinion went on to state:
19791
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While holding the privilege applicable, the majority found that it
could be, and in the case before the court, was in fact, waived. Judge
Tone concurred in the result, but his reasoning was based on a
refusal to recognize the privilege. He noted that the protection af-
forded state legislators from liability under federal law for acts done
in their legislative roles is not based upon the speech or debate
clause of the federal Constitution, a clause that applies only to
Congress, but rather upon the common law doctrine of official im-
munity.' 2 He reasoned that judicially-created official immunity
should not be extended to federal criminal cases against state legis-
lators because separation of powers considerations are inapplicable
and the threat of federal executive interference with the independ-
ence of state legislators is not confirmed by history. Finally, he
concluded that, in the absence of such immunity, no purpose would
be served by recognizing an evidentiary privilege.' 3
Because of the Craig panel's thorough exposition of the counter-
vailing considerations at issue in the determination of whether to
apply a speech or debate privilege to state legislators, the full Sev-
enth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, was content with an abbreviated
per curiam. Five judges adhered to Judge Tone's position with the
caveat that legislative conduct, standing alone, could not be used
to support an inference of wrongdoing. Judge Cummings held to his
original majority opinion; Judge Swygert accepted the rationale of
that opinion, but concluded that the privilege was not waived; Chief
Judge Fairchild would have upheld the privilege on the basis of the
Illinois Constitution, but agreed with the disposition on waiver
grounds. 4
In re Grand Jury Proceedings5 presented the next opportunity for
the courts to review the issue. There, a senator and the chief clerk
[A] refusal to recognize a speech or debate privilege for state legislators would
have an inhibiting effect on the conduct of members of the Illinois General Assem-
bly. This threat to the legislature's independence is fundamentally inconsistent
with the idea of legislative action reflected in the policy, purpose and history of the
privilege.
Id. at 779.
12. Id. at 782 (Tone, J., concurring)(citations omitted).
13. Id.
14. United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.)(rehearing en banc)(per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Compare Note, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 550, 555 (1977)("Neither
case law nor sound policy considerations dictate the Craig result") with Note, 45 CINN. L.
REV. 325, 332 (1976) ("An absolute common law speech or debate privilege in the Craig
context [is] inappropriate").
With the suppression order thus reversed, the case proceeded to trial. Two of the legislators
were convicted and one acquitted. See United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1978).
15. 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
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of the Pennsylvania State Senate intervened in a grand jury sub-
poena enforcement proceeding. The subpoena sought production of
the financial and payroll records and other documents of the Senate
Majority Appropriations Committee. The district court held that
state legislators are entitled to a common law speech or debate
privilege and limited the subpoena to committee payroll records and
other financial records that did not apply to senators or their per-
sonal staffs. In addition, the court prohibited the grand jury's in-
quiry into acts that are an integral part of the legislative process or
concern a legislator's motive behind a particular legislative act.
The senator and the clerk, in their capacities as intervenors, ap-
pealed." The Third Circuit majority rejected the application of ei-
ther the federal or Pennsylvania constitutional speech or debate
privilege, but nevertheless concluded that the principles of common
law, viewed in light of reason and experience, warrant recognition
of an evidentiary privilege. The court focused on the deep historical
roots that led to the inclusion of the privilege in the federal Consti-
tution and that of most of the states. Reinforced by the principles
of federalism which mandate appropriate respect for state func-
tions, the court deemed the evidentiary privilege necessary to pro-
tect the conscientious majority of legislators, even though the prose-
cution of the few who betray the public trust will be hindered. 7
Judge Gibbons concurred in the result on the ground that a cross
appeal by the government would have been necessary to raise the
issues adverse to its position. He also agreed with the disposition of
the constitutional issues. However, he rejected what he perceived as
the dictum that an evidentiary privilege exists which allows legisla-
tors to decline to testify about legislative acts or speech." After
16. Because of their status as intervenors, they were allowed to take an appeal in the
absence of the generally required contempt sentence for refusal to comply with a court order.
563 F.2d at 580. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974); Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
17. 563 F.2d at 583. Because the court recognized the privilege, it was compelled to deal
with the scope of the privilege in the context of the facts before the court. See also United
States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 291-94 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted - U.S. - (1979).
Although the scope of the privilege is beyond the ambit of this article, it is worthwhile to note
that recognition of the privilege will generate complex collateral issues in an area in which it
is very difficult to draw the lines. Compare McSurley v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir.
1977)(en banc), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 434 U.S. 1043 (1978) with Davis v.
Passman, - U.S. , -, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643, 4649 (1979)(Stewart, J., dissenting). See
generally Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J.
366 (1967).
18. 563 F.2d at 586 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Whether the majority's discussion was dicta
is irrelevant here. Nonetheless, although the majority did not expressly indicate as much, its
privilege discussion can be read as a means of discharging the court's responsibility to control
the grand jury process through its supervisory powers.
19791
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positing a variety of hypothetical questions left unanswered by rec-
ognition of the privilege,'" he concluded that a judicially-fashioned
privilege should not be created because there was no evidence that
it would increase a legislator's tendency to be free in his utter-
ances.Z2
The only decision on the subject that produced unanimity among
the judges who considered the issue is United States v. DiCarlo.2 '
There, a Massachusetts state senator was convicted for extorting
payments from a construction management firm in return for a
favorable report from a legislative committee that was scrutinizing
the circumstances under which the firm obtained a state contract.
The court declined to consider the issue in terms of an evidentiary
privilege, as the defendant requested, but viewed the question be-
fore it from the perspective of an extension of the official immunity
doctrine. 22 On that basis, it concluded that concepts of federalism
do not compel the extension of special protection to state legisla-
tors.2 However, in order to confront the Third Circuit's evidentiary
rationale in Grand Jury, the court followed the Craig en banc major-
ity: without a limitation on enforcement, there is no basis for creat-
ing a limitation that handicaps proof.2"
Finally, in United States v. Gillock,25 a Tennessee state senator
was charged with accepting bribes to help prevent a suspect's extra-
dition and to secure master electrician licenses for certain individu-
als. The district court granted defendant's motion to exclude much
of the evidence on the basis of an evidentiary speech or debate
19. 563 F.2d at 586-87 (Gibbons, J., concurring):
Is it applicable only in federal criminal prosecutions, and only when the legisla-
tive act or speech would tend to incriminate a member.of the legislature? Could
the legislator assert the privilege where another defendant sought to introduce evi-
dence of such act or speech defensively? If so, would not its recognition run afoul
of the sixth amendment right to compulsory process? If it is available in civil cases,
could it be used as an effective means of preventing the successful prosecution of
civil rights cases . . .? Does it apply not only to members of the state legislature,
but also to the myriad municipalities, counties, school boards, and state adminis-
trative agencies which exercise, to one extent or another, the Commonwealth's
legislative powers? If so, would it not thwart the successful prosecution of civil
rights cases . . .?
20. Id. at 587 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
21. 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
22. Id at 806: "To the extent that a privilege exists, it antedated the rule, and was neither
created, nor enlarged, by the rule. The effect of a substantive immunity may be to bar
evidentiary use of the particular act, but the rule merely applies the immunity, rather than
establishes it."
23. See text accompanying notes 130-39 infra.
24. Id. at 807.
25. 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1979).
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privilege, and the government appealed.
Before the Sixth Circuit, the parties conceded that neither the
federal nor the Tennessee constitutional speech or debate clause
applied. Accordingly, the point of contention was riveted on
whether an evidentiary privilege should be recognized. Beginning
with the proposition that the potential exists for abuse of federal
prosecutorial power against members of state legislatures of an op-
posite political persuasion,2 the court traced the history of consitu-
tional adjudication surrounding the federal speech or debate clause.
Although it acknowledged the inapplicability of those decisions, the
majority concluded that the long history and the need for protection
of legislative speech or debate mandated the privilege's recogni-
tion.2
Judge Weick's dissent contained a broad review of the issues in-
volved. First, he considered the historic purpose which gave rise to
the creation of the speech or debate principle-the conflict between
Parliament and the Crown-relevant only in the context of a single
government and, because no separation of powers question is raised
by the federal prosecution of a state legislator, he concluded that no
corresponding privilege should be recognized. Second, he accepted
the Craig-DiCarlo principle that the absence of official immunity
from criminal liability precludes application of an evidentiary privi-
lege. Third, Judge Weick suggested that the nature of the American
judicial and political systems made remote the threat of federal
prosecutorial influence upon the affairs of state legislatures. Finally,
he determined that the quagmire of complex policy decisions con-
cerning the scope and application of the privilege were matters
better left to Congress. 28
These four cases leave unresolved the viability of evidence of offi-
cial acts in the federal prosecution of state legislators. With in-
creased federal resources focusing upon corruption on the state and
local level, it is imperative that prosecutors and judges receive guid-
ance on this issue. As the cases indicate, the problem cannot be
resolved without consideration of federal and state constitutional
questions, the impact of federalism and federal-state comity, and
the application of evidentiary privilege principles. The resolution
ultimately depends upon how the contemporary state legislature is
perceived in the American political system and the extent to which
its conduct is subject to the influence of the federal executive.
26. Id. at 286.
27. Id. at 290.
28. Id. at 296-99 (Weick, J., dissenting).
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THE APPLICATION OF STATE LAW
Although only two of the judges who considered the issue found
the existence of a state constitutional speech or debate clause-deter-
minative, 29 the theory warrants some comment. In federal question
cases the clear weight of authority supports reference to federal law
on the issue of existence and scope of an asserted privilege.30 Al-
though federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law, and
with it the evidentiary privileges, of the forum state, no such re-
quirement exists in federal question cases. This is particularly true
in criminal cases where the reception of evidence is subject to the
constraints of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,'3
which was promulgated pursuant to enabling legislation, declaring
that "[aIll law in conflict . . . shall be of no force or effect ....
In accordance with the rationale of Rule 26, the cases uniformly
have held that neither the statutes nor common law rules of a state
control the admission of evidence in criminal cases in the district. 3
29. See United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.)(rehearing en banc) (per curiam)
(Fairchild, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); United States v. Craig, No.
74 CR 877, (unreported memorandum opinion) (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Kirkland, J.). Contra, United
States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 294 (6th Cir. 1978)(Weick, J., dissenting) cert. granted,
U.S. - (1979): "The Speech or Debate privilege for state legislators provided in the Consti-
tution of the State of Tennessee is relevant only where state law is applicable, and affords
no protection to state legislators who are being prosecuted in a federal court for committing
a federal crime."
30. Heathman v. United States District Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1974)(state
privilege for tax returns inapplicable in federal question case).
31. Rule 26, as pertinent, originally provided:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 26. Following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 26 was
amended to provide: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by thse rules, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3771. The scant legislative history surrounding the enabling legislation
indicates that the "all laws in conflict" provision was intended to avoid the confusion that
was generated by the need to refer to state law to decide issues in federal cases. As the House
Committee reported, "So long as it remains necessary to search the common law, the statutes,
and constitutional provisions of the States, just so long will our procedure remain confused
and complex." H.R. REP. No. 2492 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940)(emphasis added). Compare
Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 445, 453 (1944) stating that Rule
26 was drafted to bring order to the chaos caused by reliance on the divergent state laws and
to insure that "tt]he federal courts would not be fettered or shackled to the variations of
the local law of evidence," with Howard, Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 51 YALE L.J.
763 (1942).
33. United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1326, 1327 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 933 (1971); see Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of
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For example, in United States v. Harper,34 defendant claimed that
Mississippi's statutory physician-patient privilege barred the ad-
mission of testimony of two doctors who had diagnosed his mental
competence. The court based its decision against the defendant on
Rule 26. It held that under common law principles, as interpreted
and applied by the federal courts, no physician-patient privilege
existed. Consequently, under the federal standard, the testimony of
the two doctors was admissable.3
As the courts have recognized, Rule 26 envisions a uniform federal
practice in all federal criminal cases; it does not make admissibility
of evidence in federal courts dependent upon diverse state laws.37
Based upon this established principle, it is incorrect to rely upon the
speech or debate provision of a state constitution as a basis for
suppression of evidence in a federal prosecution of a state legislator.
THE FEDERAL EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
Prior to 1833, the Supreme Court had taken a relatively static
approach toward the admission of evidence in federal criminal
trials. That approach, governed exclusively by state law, resulted in
the then black letter principle that the law of the respective states
in 1789 or when the state was admitted to the union was applicable
in the federal criminal courts unless state legislation or judicial
decisions have established a weight of authority in favor of a more
modern view.8
Another Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 547 (1956)("Thus, in criminal cases, the federal
law of exclusion and admission controls.")
34. 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. See note 31 supra.
36. 450 F.2d at 1035. Judge Wisdom's conclusion in Harper, in terms of both brevity
and analysis, is consistent with the decisions of other courts that have considered a defen-
dant's reliance on state privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Hankins, 581 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1978) (federal common law, not state law, determines scope of attorney-client privilege);
Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (California "shield" law does not
provide privilege for newsman called to testify before federal grand jury); Kerr v. United
States District Court, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975)(state privilege for documents of
state agency inapplicable in § 1983 case); United States v. Mancuso, 445 F.2d 691, 695
(5th Cir. 19 71)(state physician-patient privilege); United States v. Balisteri, 403 F.2d 472,
481 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971)(Illinois accountant privilege); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 n.2 (2d Cir. 1961)(New York accountant privilege).
37. United States v. Martin, 372 F.2d 63, 66 (7th Cir. 1967); see United States v. Infelice,
506 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); United States v.
Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
38. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 HARv. L. REV. 554, 565 (1930);
see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892)(for states admitted after 1789, common
law on date of admission to union governed federal criminal evidence); United States v. Reid,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851)(admission of evidence in federal criminal case controlled
by "the law of the state, as it was when the courts were established by the Judiciary Act of
1789").
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The break with tradition came with the Court's decision in Funk
v. United States,31 in which the common law doctrine that a wife
could not testify in her husband's behalf was abandoned. The Court
recognized, for the first time, that a rule of evidence at one time
thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the
experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has
clearly demonstrated the fallacy of the rule.
That Funk had signaled the dawn of an evolving federal common
law of criminal evidence was made apparent, later in the same term,
by Wolfe v. United States." In Wolfe, the lower court had admitted,
through a stenographer, a statement in a letter that defendant had
written to his wife. Admission was justified on the basis of a statute
in force when the territory of Washington was admitted to state-
hood.42 Although affirming the conviction, the Court, in a unani-
mous opinion written by Justice Stone, held that, under Funk, evi-
dentiary questions in "criminal trials in the federal courts are not
necessarily restricted to those local rules in force at the time of the
admission into the Union of the particular state where the trial
takes place, but are governed by common-law principles as inter-
preted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and
experience."4
3
Liberally paraphrasing Justice Stone's language in Wolfe, Con-
gress approved Rule 26 to place its imprimatur on the notion of a
developing federal common law to govern evidentiary questions in
criminal cases." However, the rule did not prove to be a panacea.
While cognizant of its power to develop a federal common law in this
regard," the Supreme Court demonstrated a reluctance to alter
longstanding rules by decision." And the lower federal courts, for
the most part, failed to show progress toward modernization.
39. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
40. Id. at 381.
41. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
42. See Wolfe v. United States, 64 F.2d 566, 567 (9th Cir. 1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
43. 291 U.S. at 12.
44. The courts consistently have recognized that Rule 26 grew out of the Funk-Wolfe
rationale. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); Shores v. United States,
174 F.2d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1949); Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1948).
45. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213-16 (1960); Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 614 (1953); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 755 (1952).
46. Justice Jackson described the reason for the reluctance in the following manner: "It
is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent sallies into the field cannot recast
the body of case law on this subject in many, many years, even if it were clear what the rules
should be." Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
47. Judge Clark believed that the lower courts tended "to overlook the fact that our duty
is to interpret 'the principles of the common law,' in the 'light of reason and experience,'"
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Given these failings, the courts recognized the wisdom of establish-
ing a continuing body to study and recommend uniform rules of
evidence in the federal courts."'
The ideas ultimately reached fruition with the establishment of
an advisory committee to recommend federal rules of evidence. As
various proposed drafts were presented to the Court and returned
to the committee for continuing revision, a lengthy and detailed
series of rules regarding the question of privilege emerged. 9 How-
ever, the privilege section of the proposed rules, as eventually trans-
mitted to Congress by the Court, created such controversy" that the
House Judiciary Committee eliminated all of the enumerated privi-
leges and replaced them with a single rule5' that left the courts free
to develop privileges under the standard set forth in Rule 26.52
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Under the language of Rule 501, the "principles of common law"
appear to serve as a guidepost to the determination of whether a
privilege should exist. If the common law did not recognize a privi-
lege, the rule does not seem to prevent a court from creating the
privilege "in the light of reason and experience."53 On the other
hand, reason and experience may dictate that a privilege founded
on the common law should not be applied in particular factual
circumstances. The recognition of a privilege in common law, how-
and assailed the courts for failing to recognize that Rule 26 "compels us to discover anew a
rational rule." United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1949)(dissenting opinion).
48. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958)(Stewart, J., concurring).
49. See PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, §§ 501-13, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-60 (1973).
50. In presenting the Conference Report to the House, Congressman Hungate, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, stated that "50 percent of the
complaints received by the Criminal Justice Subcommittee related to the privilege section."
CONG. REC. H. 12253 (1974). See generally United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 776 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
51. Having come full cycle from Rule 26, Rule 501, as enacted, read:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. § 501, 65 F.R.D. 131, 146 (1975) (emphasis added).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973); S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-7 (1974).
53. See United States v. Hankins, 581 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1978); Lewis v. United States,
517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
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ever, should establish a form of presumptive validity which would
require a more compelling showing, under the reason and experience
barometer, to justify its abandonment. Viewed in this manner, the
rule is sufficiently flexible to endow the courts with latitude to de-
termine whether reason and experience authorize the creation of a
privilege in a specific case.54
The history of the speech or debate privilege has been so well
documented elsewhere55 that, for present purposes, its relevant pre-
cepts may be gleaned from an examination of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Tenney v. Brandhove. 51 Engulfed in the national
emotion engendered by the McCarthy era, Tenney involved a suit
for damages, under the Civil Rights Act, against members of the
California state legislature's Un-American Activities Committee.
Starting with the proposition that freedom of speech and debate
in the legislature was accepted as a matter of course by the Founders
of this country, the Court canvassed the development of the privi-
lege through the state constitutions. Having found the principle of
speech or debate firmly rooted in our history, the Court concluded
that the Civil Rights Act which formed the basis of the suit was not
intended to impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and
reason.57 Accordingly, the Court held that the action could not be
54. See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975)(federal courts have
"the right and the responsibility to examine the policies behind the federal common law
privileges and to alter or amend them when reason and experience so demand"); 120 CONG.
REC. H. 12254 (1974).
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the natural development of the law. "The
year books can teach us how a principle or rule had its beginnings. They cannot teach us that
what was the beginning shall also be the end." B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 104-05
(1924). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1896).
Thus, while not determinative, the existence of a common law speech or debate privilege
operates to color the issue of whether that type of privilege should be recognized, in the light
of reason and experience, in the federal prosecution of state legislators.
55. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 666 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1881). See also Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech
or Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2
SUFFOLK L. REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cella]; Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases:
An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Ervin]; Reinstein & Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reinstein & Silvergate]; Yankwich, The Immunity
of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960
(1951)[hereinafter cited as Yankwichl; Comment, Brewster, Gravel and Legislative
Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Immunity]; Com-
ment, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution, 75 YALE L. J. 335 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Bribed Congressman's Immunity].
56. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
57. Id. at 376.
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maintained against the California legislators.
There is no question that the holding in Tenney was extremely
narrow;5" but some confusion has resulted from the Court's failure
to specifically identify the axis of that holding.5" At the time Tenney
was decided, California had no speech or debate privilege.'" Nothing
in the opinion suggests that the Court purported to apply the federal
constitutional privilege to the issue. Therefore, as the Court has
subsequently indicated, Tenney simply was not a speech or debate
clause case.6 Rather, the decision rested on the proposition that the
Civil Rights Act did not affect the common law immunity of legisla-
tors."
The common law immunity on which Tenney rested was not in-
tended to mirror the speech or debate protection embodied in the
Constitution . 3 Rather, it reflected the official immunity which the
common law recognized to insulate officials from liability for their
decisions and action in functioning within the public trust. 4
58. "We conclude only that here the individual defendants and the legislative committee
were acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, and that the statute
of 1871 does not create civil liability for such conduct." 341 U.S. at 379. See United States v.
Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 297 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting), cert. granted, - U.S. __
(1979) ("Even though the Supreme Court in Tenney discussed at some length the speech or
debate privilege, its holding was quite narrow . . .").
59. Compare Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 55, at 1114 n.3 ("The discussion [of the
Speech or Debate Clause] in Tenney, although extensive, was technically dictum since the
suit was brought against state legislators under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . and the
Court fashioned a common law privilege similar to the constitutional privilege for congress-
men") with Cella, supra note 55, at 1087 n.212 (Tenney indicated that immunity for civil and
criminal liability for state legislators is the same).
60. California's Constitution provided legislators with only freedom from arrest. See 341
U.S. at 375-76 n.5; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
61. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 n.10 (1972). For this reason, language in
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1973), which suggests that Tenney had
extended the federal constitutional clause to the states, is clearly incorrect. This statement
may be regarded as pure dicta since Eslinger, nevertheless, was correctly decided; Tenney,
in fact, held that "members of a state legislative committee, acting in a field where legislators
traditionally have power to act, are immune from liability under the Civil Rights Act."
Gambocz v. Sub-Committee on Claims, 423 F.2d 674, 675 (3d Cir. 1970).
62. Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794, 798 (3d Cir. 1974)(emphasis added); see Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554 (1967)("§ 1983 gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney. . . that the
immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished by § 1983");
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting)(Tenney cited for
proposition that "standards governing the granting of relief under § 1983 are to be developed
by the federal courts in accordance with the purposes of the statute and as a matter of federal
common law").
63. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 581 (3d Cir. 1977)(footnote
ommitted)(" Tenney v. Brandhove did not apply the Speech or Debate Clause of the United
States Constitution to a state legislator as has sometimes been asserted.").
64. "The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an impression of a
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Official immunity, as derived from the common law, has been
recognized in a variety of situations which state public officials were
sued for civil damages. 5 However, there is no corresponding immun-
ity in criminal cases. The reason for the distinction was clearly
articulated in United States v. Anzelmo,16 where a state attorney
general, charged with mail fraud, interposed the bar of official im-
munity. The court held that in civil suits, the susceptibility of an
official to harassment is present since any individual can institute
a civil suit against another. Immunity is necessary, therefore, to
protect against suits based on official conduct. In contrast, the po-
tential for harassment is not present in criminal prosecutions be-
cause only government officials can bring the action, and only after
a grand jury indictment.67
Thus, a precise evaluation of the type of immunity which Tenney
extended to state legislators is critical. If the Court intended to
create a federal common law immunity for state legislators which
is commensurate with constitutional speech or debate protection,
that immunity would establish a "common law" starting point for
Rule 501 analysis. This, in turn, would require a compelling demon-
stration of why reason and experience should make the common law
doctrine inapplicable to federal proescutions of state legislators. On
the other hand, if Tenney was based on nothing more than official
immunity, the common law protection would not extend to a crimi-
nal prosecution, and reason and experience would have to dictate
the creation of an evidentiary privilege in these circumstances. For
several reasons, it appears that Tenney represents the latter posi-
tion.
First, the Court repeatedly has relied upon Tenney in cases in-
policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 572-73 (1959).
65. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 479 (1978)(absolute immunity for certain fed-
eral officials; qualified immunity for others); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.555
(1978)(qualified immunity for state prison officials); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976)(absolute immunity for state prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(qualified immunity for local school board officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974)(qualified immunity for state executives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)(absolute
judicial immunity). Cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)(scope of judicial immunity).
66. 319 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. La. 1970).
67. Id. at 1118-19 (citation omitted). See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), aff'd sub. nor., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)(executive privilege
"cannot be claimed to shield executive officers from prosecution for crime"). Cf. United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)(federal judge
need not be impeached before being indicted); Cook v. Bangs, 31 F. 640, 642 (C.C.D. Minn.
1887)(A judge "is just as amenable to the criminal law as any private citizen").
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volving an official immunity analysis. Doe v. McMillan,6" provides
the most striking example. In Doe, an injunction was sought by the
parents of school children who had been referred to in a derogatory
manner in a report submitted by a House subcommittee after an
investigation into the District of Columbia public school system.
Named defendants ranged from the Chairman and members of the
House Committee on D.C. Affairs to representatives of the Govern-
ment Printing Office.
Justice White commenced the Court's opinion by indicating that
the case concerned the scope of congressional immunity under the
speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution as well
as the reach of official immunity in the legislative context. 9 Having
indicated that the two doctrines were in fact separate, Justice
White, after relating the facts, divided his opinion into two distinct
parts. The first part, holding the members of Congress and their
aides immune under the speech or debate clause, did not mention
Tenney. The second, limiting the official immunity of Printing
Office representatives to the extent that publishing and distribu-
tion serve a legitimate legislative function, extensively relied upon
Tenney and employed it to support the proposition that official
immunity has been held applicable to the legislative branch.70
The second basis for an assessment of the scope of Tenney rests
on the injunction cases. Attempts to enjoin the legislative activities
of the United States Congress uniformly have been barred by the
absolute immunity provided by the speech or debate clause.7' How-
ever, the same result has not held true for injunction suits against
state legislatures.
Although many federal decisions have authorized injunctions
against state legislators without discussing either common law offi-
cial immunity or the speech or debate privilege,7 2 the Fourth Circuit
68. 414 U.S. 306 (1973).
69. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 319 n.13. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1976); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316 (1975)(both cases analyzing Tenney in the context of official
immunity).
It is significant to note that one of the Court's most recent pronouncements in the area
specifically addressed Speech or Debate immunity in the context of federal legislators, noting
that "the Clause shields federal legislators with absolute immunity 'not only from the conse-
quences of litigation's result, but also from the burden of defending themselves.' " Davis v.
Passman, - U.S. , n.l, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643, 4645 n.11 (1979) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
71. E.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Powell v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Stamler v.
Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
72. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966)(Georgia legislature enjoined from refus-
19791
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confronted the issue in Jordan v. Hutcheson.73 Three black lawyers
sought an injunction against a Virginia legislative committee to
prevent harassment of their right to seek judicial recourse against
racial segregation in the state. Holding that an injunction could be
available under the circumstances, the court found that the official
immunity recognized in Tenney was limited to dollar damages.74
The fact that state legislators have been subjected to federal in-
junction suits scarcely accords with the absolute nature of speech
or debate protection. Because state legislators may be enjoined, it
appears that, unlike their federal counterparts, the federal common
law protection which they were provided in Tenney was something
less that the equivalent of speech or debate immunity.
Finally, O'Shea v. Littleton'5 suggests that Tenney was not based
on anything beyond judicially fashioned common law immunity.
Commenting on the vulnerability of state judges to criminal *prose-
cution, the Court acknowledged that legislative officers stand in the
same footing as their judicial and executive brethren with respect
to criminal offenses." The Court thus indicated that the common
law immunity of legislators does not extend to criminal liability.
The judges who have refused to recognize a federal speech or
debate privilege for state legislators have based their position on
the fact that, unlike members of Congress, state legislators enjoy no
common law official immunity from criminal liability. Taking the
matter one step further, they have concluded that, in the absence
of underlying immunity, there is no reason to recognize an eviden-
tiary privilege.77 In order to take that step, however, it is necessary
ing to seat duly elected member because of his anti-war statements); Liveright v. Joint
Comm. of the General Assembly of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968)(injunction
against state legislative committee investigating organization's subversive activities); Bush
v. New Orleans Parish School Board, 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem. sub nor.,
Denny v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1961) (Louisiana legislature enjoined from interfering with
school board's attempt to comply with desegregation order).
73. 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
74. Id. at 602.
75. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
76. The Court stated:
[W]e have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative
or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise crimi-
nal deprivations of constitutional rights. On the contrary, the judicially fashioned
doctrine of official immunity does not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal conduct
as proscribed by an Act of Congress. .. '
Id. at 503 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
77. See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 298 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting)
cert. granted, U.S. - (1979); United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 807 (lit Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 587 (3d
Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.)(rehearing
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to read Rule 501 to indicate that "whether the claimed privilege
should be recognized as a development in the federal common law
of evidence depends on whether there is an underlying immunity."7 8
This proposition provides the correct result when applied to the
federal prosecution of a state legislator; but it is inconsistent with
the intent of Rule 501, and its general application would remove the
federal judiciary from the development of the law with respect to
privileges and leave that matter to Congress alone. Although there
are those who believe that Congress is better suited than the courts
to deal with the ramifications of a privilege's creation,7" the rule was
specifically designed "to provide the courts with flexibility to de-
velop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."8 This was done to
calm the fury created by an earlier draft of the rule which contained
controversial modifications or restrictions upon common law privi-
leges.8
If a privilege, in order to achieve recognition under Rule 501, must
depend on an underlying immunity, there are few situations in
which a federal court could create a privilege under the rule. In the
absence of a governing statute, a witness who received an informal
grant of immunity might prevail on the court, under this doctrine,
to provide him with a privilege of some type to prevent the introduc-
tion of evidence derived from his immunized testimony.2 But these
situations are rare. Indeed, were we without a Bill of Rights, a court
would be prohibited from recognizing a privilege against self-
incrimination because there is obviously no underlying immunity.
Yet, the common law has recognized a number of privileges in
order to prevent intrusions upon full and open communication in a
socially desirable relationship." And the courts have acknowledged
that in certain circumstances confidential matters are shielded for
considerations of policy, while in other cases a witness may be ex-
en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
78. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.) (Tone, J., concurring), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 973 (1976).
79. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972); United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d
284, 299 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1979).
80. 120 CONG. REC. H. 12254 (1974)(Comments of Chairman Hungate). See Ryan v.
C.I.R., 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Allery,
526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975).
81. SENATE REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7058 (1974). See text accompanying note 54 supra.
82. Cf. United States v. Alessi, 536 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1976) (enforcement of informal
immunity grant).
83. See generally Morgan & McGuire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50
HARV. L. REV. 909 (1937); Platz, Various Privileges, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 239; Note, Privileged
Communications-Some Recent Developments, 5 VAND. L. REV. 590 (1952).
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cused from telling all he knows."4 Because of the intricate policy
considerations involved in the creation of a privilege, Rule 501 seems
to envision a development of the law of privilege on the basis of the
practical impact of evolving relationships in a maturing society, or,
in other words, "reason and experience." Thus, to correlate the
creation of a privilege solely to an underlying immunity would con-
travene the intent of the rule.
Under this interpretation of the rule, the conclusion that state
legislators have no common law official immunity remains impor-
tant. That, however, does not end the matter. 5 It merely establishes
that there is no presumption in favor of a privilege to be overcome
by reason and experience. The courts are free to decide whether the
underlying policy considerations, as seen through the eyes of reason
and experience, authorize the creation of a speech or debate privi-
lege for state legislators in federal prosecutions.
Privilege Based on Reason and Experience
Wigmore has commented that "when we come to examine the
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption
that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable
of giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly
exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general
rule." 8 The Supreme Court, in discussing privileges, has often rec-
ognized that whatever their origins, the exceptions to the demand
for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed because they are in derogation of the search for truth. 7
It is in this posture that one must consider whether a speech or
debate privilege for state legislators should be recognized in light
of reason and experience.
Reason
The doctrine of speech or debate has been recognized in this coun-
try to secure the separation of powers, 8 to insure unrestrained legis-
84. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 332 (1950) (any exemption from the duty to testify "presupposes a very real interest to
be protected").
85. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1977); see United States v.
Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
86. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Dean Wigmore's
anti-privilege assumption springs from the well-accepted notion that "the public has a right
to every man's evidence." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
87. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
88. See text accompanying notes 91, 92 infra.
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lative debate," and to maintain judicial deference to legislative
motives. 0 These reasons have significant, historical weight when
applied to the federal Congress; but when they are examined in the
context of a federal prosecution of state legislators, the impact of the
reasons underlying the privilege is lost. Accordingly, the "reason"
which supports the privilege has no application to state legislators.
1. Separation of Powers
There is little doubt that the separation of powers doctrine is the
dominant reason behind the speech or debate provision in the Con-
stitution.9" At the heart of the separation of powers theory is the
belief that one branch of the federal government shall never be
controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to the coercive
influence of either of the other departments. 2 Since the Constitu-
tion 'does not impose a similar three-branch government structure
upon the individual states, 3 separation of powers provides neither
a reason nor a parallel for the application of the legislative privilege
to the federal prosecution of a state legislator. That type of situation
obviously involves no question of the permissible power of one
branch of the federal government to intrude upon or review the
actions of another branch.94
89. See text accompanying note 99 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
91. "[Tihe privilege is broad enough to insure the historic independence of the Legisla-
tive Branch, essential to our separation of powers, but narrow enough to guard against the
excesses of those who would corrupt the process by corrupting its Members." United States
v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972).
92. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1933); see Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928). As the court has repeatedly recognized, "[tihe purpose of
the clause is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may
be performed independently." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975); see Doe v. McMillen, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 602,
616 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1966). See also 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325-27 (Ford ed. 1904).
Accordingly, in our tripartite federal system, Speech or Debate serves the "function of
reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
93. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
94. For the same reason, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), was not a separation
of powers case. See Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 602 n.5 (4th Cir. 1963).
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1967) Justice Douglas stated that the "doctrine of
separation of powers is, of course, applicable only to the relations between the branches of
the Federal Government and those of the States." (dissenting opinion). See Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) ("the separation of powers principle ... has no applicability to the
federal judiciary's relationship to the states"); Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415
U.S. 605, 611 (1973)(mayor's defense to civil rights action based upon separation of powers
theory "misplaced because ... this case has nothing to do with the tripartite arrangement
of the Federal Constitution"). Cf. Baker v. Barr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (relationship of
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In the federal system, the speech or debate clause acts as a means
of preserving the balance of power among the three co-equal
branches of government. To maintain that unique balance, the Su-
preme Court necessarily has questioned its constitutional power, in
light of the clause, to examine intra-legislative action. To do so may
upset the balance of power in the form of an exertion of undue
influence on a co-equal branch of government.
Separation of powers does not provide a basis for extending a
speech or debate privilege to state legislators because the power to
bring a federal prosecution evolves from the co-equal functioning of
all three federal branches. 5 Congress has passed the laws on which
the prosecution rests; the executive has elected to pursue the case;
and the judiciary stands ready to hear it. Accordingly, the question
is not one of intra-federal power.
2. Legislative Debate
A second reason for the existence of the privilege arose from the
English history that preceded the founding of this country.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Parliament
clashed with the kings, who were prone to use the sedition laws to
intimidate critical members, the privilege evolved to secure a basic
right of free speech." When certain members began to denounce the
King's policies, the prosecutions which ensued97 culminated in 1689
with the insertion of an unequivocal speech or debate provision in
the English Bill of Rights.
With the precepts of the Bill of Rights woven into our democratic
fabric, freedom of speech and action in the legislature was presumed
by those who severed the colonies from the Crown and founded our
nation. 8 On that basis, the speech or debate clause was inserted in
federal judiciary to the states does not give rise to a political question); Gomillion v. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (state insulation from judicial review is not carried over when state
power circumvents federal rights).
95. See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissent-
ing), cert. granted, - U.S. __ (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 581-
82 (3d Cir. 1977).
96. "The House began to conceive of itself seriously as Grand Inquest of the Nation,
demanding 'a voice in the general policy of the country, and [the right] to criticize the action
of the executive in modern fashion.' " Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 55, at 1126, quoting
1 W. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 35 (5th ed. 1932).
97. See Proceedings Against Sir William Williams, 13 How. St. Tr. 1370 (1684-
95)(prosecution against member for republication of House committee report which alleged
misconduct by King); Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, Denzil Hollis and Benjamin
Valintine, 3 How. St. Tr. 294 (1629)(prosecution of members of House of Commons for
seditious libel). See generally Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 55, at 1122-35.
98. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
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the Constitution, with little comment, to provide that a legislator
"should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.""5 So
viewed, speech or debate protection, designed to insure unbridled
legislative debate which is totally free from executive intimidation,
is, in context, similar to the safeguard provided by the first amend-
ment.
Therefore, it is important, from a legal standpoint, to consider
whether the absence of a legislative privilege will hamper free de-
bate by state legislators.' °0 As indicated, the speech or debate clause
evolved from the prosecutions brought by the King for various sedi-
tious and treasonous speeches in Parliament. The development of
first amendment theory in this country has made analogous prose-
cutions of state legislators impossible. Consequently, the first
amendment's protection is alone sufficient to promote freedom of
speech in the state legislature.
The protection of robust legislative debate by the first amend-
ment is evidenced by Bond v. Floyd. ,o, In Bond, the Georgia Legisla-
ture refused to seat a duly elected representative because of his anti-
war statements. Without considering the legislative privilege impli-
cations raised by the injunction that Bond sought against the state
legislature, the Court rested its decision to grant the injunction on
first amendment grounds.'0 2
99. II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896); see Yankwich, supra note 55, at
967.
100. It is equally important to consider whether the absence of a privilege will hamper
robust legislative debate from a practical standpoint. See text accompanying notes 140-45
infra.
101. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
102. Id. at 136-37. The court held:
The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government
requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues
of policy. The central commitment of the First Amendment, . . . is that 'debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' . . . Just as erro-
neous statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing
space it needs to survive, so statements criticizing public policy and the implemen-
tation of it must be similarly protected. The State argues that [this] principle
should not be extended to statements by a legislator because the policy of encourag-
ing free debate about governmental operations only applies to the citizen-critic of
his government. . . .The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue
is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legisla-
tors. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political ques-
tions so that their constituents can be fully informed by them, and be better able
to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in govern-
mental debates by the person they have elected to represent them.
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It has been argued tht the first amendment is an inadequate
substitute for the speech or debate privilege because it neither cre-
ates a privilege against giving evidence nor -prohibits a jury from
questioning the motives of the speaker.'0 3 However, this position
confuses the scope of the privilege with the reason for its creation.
Investigatory inquiry into a legislator's official acts and statements
was prohibited in the broadest language because of threat posed to
Parliament by broad sedition and treason laws. The first amend-
ment, as interpreted today, protects all citizens from criminal prose-
cution on the basis of the type of political expression which gave rise
to the doctrine of speech or debate.1'0 Absent separation of powers
considerations, there is no corresponding benefit to be gained from
extending the privilege beyond the ambit of first amendment pro-
tection.
3. Deference to Legislative Motive
The third reason furnished by the courts to support the legislative
privilege arises from the theory of judicial deference to the motives
that underlie legislative acts. As Justice Frankfurter recognized in
Tenney, the holding of Fletcher v. Peck, '01 that it did not comport
with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the mo-
tives of legislators, has remained unquestioned.'06 The rationale is
based upon the belief that legislators must be free to speak and act
without fear that their motives will be questioned at some later time
in a court of law. 0 7
When separation of powers considerations and the threat to free
debate are removed from the structure, the doctrine of judicial de-
ference to the sanctity of legislative motives is eliminated. To a
great extent, that doctrine was removed from the speech or debate
framework in United States v. Brewster,0 8 where the Chief Justice
indicated that speech or debate does not proscribe inquiry into ille-
103. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973
(1976).
104. To the extent that the first amendment would not immunize state legislators from
civil suits for libel or slander, the doctrine of official immunity would provide the necessary
protection. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
105. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
106. 341 U.S. at 377.
107. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 183 (1966), quoting Ex parte Wason, L.R.
4 Q.B. 573, 577 (1869) (Lush, J.) ("I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow it to
be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot
be inquired into by criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may do or say in the
House").
108. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
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gal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative func-
tions. 09
Moreover, the cases that established the doctrine of judicial defer-
ence to legislative motives all involved challenges to statutes alleg-
edly enacted for a corrupt purpose."' There is, however, a significant
distinction between an act of the legislature and an act of one of its
members."' While a court may be "bound to proceed upon the
assumption that the legislature is an ideal person that does not
make mistakes,''1 it is unrealistic to apply that presumption to an
individual legislator.
Experience
Separation of powers, the need for legislative debate and defer-
ence to legislative motive are the several policies underlying the
speech or debate clause's original creation and inclusion in the fed-
eral Constitution. Because these "reasons" are inapposite in federal
prosecutions of state legislators, only one step remains. Rule 501
dictates that "experience", as well as "reason", be examined to
determine whether practical developments in contemporary society
warrant recognition of the privilege.
1. Federal Prosecution of Local Political Corruption
In evaluating whatever guidance experience may offer, it is note-
worthy that this country's historical experience reveals that the
threat of groundless indictments against legislators is negligible."
3
109. Id. at 528. The statement was made in response to the position taken by the dissen-
ters in Brewster who argued that, under Johnson and the decision of the Queen's Bench in
Wason, see note 107 supra, the Court could not "divine a distinction between promise and
performance" for purposes of analyzing a legislator's motives. 408 U.S. at 561 (White, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 535-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, the majority concluded that
"the English analogy .. .and the reliance on [Wason] are inapt." Id. at 518.
110. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 240 U.S. 423, 455 n.7 (1915); Calder v. Michigan, 218
U.S. 591, 598 (1910); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
111. Inquiry into the motives of legislators responsible for the enactment of a law is
concededly inadvisable (if not impossible) since the stability of statute law would
be impaired if the good or bad intentions of individual members become a criterion
for judging validity. The passage of a statute, moreover, is the work of the legisla-
ture as a responsible branch of government about whose operation assumptions of
legitimacy should be made. Deference to the formal enactment of an institution
does not, however, justify similar respect for the motives of individual officials.
From a practical standpoint, moreover, the insuperable difficulties of proof in-
volved in investigating the motives of representatives responsible for the enactment
of a statute are not duplicated when the object of investigation is a single legislator.
Bribed Congressman's Immunity, supra note 55, at 340 (footnotes omitted).
112. Commissioner's for Special Purpose of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 549
(Lord Halsbury, L.C.).
113. Bribed Congressman's Immunity, supra note 55, at 348:
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Aside from one notable instance,'" American history has recorded
no convictions of congressmen for the dissemination of statements
offensive to the Executive." 5 Thus, experience shows that even
though the inevitable discretion of prosecuting officials to initiate
groundless prosecutions is presented under every statute, it appears
doubtful that this discretion deters honest legislative speech." 6
On the other hand, the proven conduct of various officials has
prompted the courts to depict corruption in public office as "a be-
trayal of trust of the most alarming type to a free society."" ' This
legitimate sense of outrage springs from the notion that
"[plersonal influence to be exercised over an officer of government
. . . is not a vendible article in our system of law and morals.""' 8
There is, of course, no need to belabor the condemnation of politi-
cal corruption; isolated incidents of corruption must be overlooked
as part of the price we pay for the interests served by the speech or
debate clause."9 However, in the absence of constitutional re-
straints, it is imperative that the courts consider the type of conduct
that will go unpunished because of the creation of a speech or debate
evidentiary privilege.
The phrase "speech or debate" is not a magical incantation. "It
is part of wisdom, particularly for judges, not to be victimized by
First, the threat of criminal prosecution is a clumsy device for intimidating
Congressmen. More subtle techniques are available such as the threat to disclose
publicly the peccadillos of a Congressman's private life. Second, there is no tradi-
tion of congressional immunity from criminal prosecution. Third, administrative
officials are reluctant to tangle with Congressmen, even where the enforcement of
criminal statutes is involved. Finally, the threat of a groundless indictment upon a
Congressman's chances of reelection should not be exaggerated.
(footnotes omitted).
114. In Lyon's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. 1183 (No. 8646)(Vt. Cir. Ct. 1795)(decided in 1798),
Congressman Mathew Lyon was convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798 for publishing two
derogatory letters about President Adams. The Speech or Debate Clause was not raised in
defense. With an outraged citizenry in his favor, Lyon gained reelection while in prison,
refused a pardon and, upon release, returned in triumph to Washington. In 1840, legislation
was enacted to void his conviction. See J. SMrrH, FREEDOM'S FrERs 221-41 (1956); Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 55, at 1142-44.
115. See Legislative Immunity, supra note 55, at 128.
116. Bribed Congressman's Immunity, supra note 55, at 348. But see Ervin, supra note
55, at 180.
117. United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir. 1974) (Clark, J., by designa-
tion), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 910 (1975) (extortion by police officers). As Mr. Justice (then
Judge) Stevens has indicated, "[tihe muscle of the faithless public servant is just as intolera-
ble as the muscle of the Camorras .... " United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59 (7th
Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1976) (extortion by city alderman).
118. Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 275 (1880); see Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 45, 54 (1864).
119. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
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words."'"" Thus, without considering how far motives commonly
classified as ignoble have been camouflaged with a high sounding
name, "it is necessary to look the facts in their face."2'
When one looks the "facts in their face" in the cases that gave
rise to the state legislative privilege controversy, he finds a variety
of sordid schemes by state legislators: the acceptance of a pay-off
to block an extradition;' the receipt of bribes to enact legislation
to ease the task of obtaining valuable licenses;'23 the use of extor-
tionate means to gain payments from a company under investiga-
tion by a legislative investigating commission to assure a favorable
report; 2 ' extortion to defeat a bill unfavorable to the victim indus-
try. 25
Conduct of this nature is undoubtedly rare in the state legislative
process throughout the nation; and it is likewise undoubtedly repul-
sive to almost every state legislator in the country. But because the
examples do exist, 2 the recognition of a speech or debate privilege,
as a matter of experience, should take into consideration the realis-
tic threat that political corruption of the type described would
gravely undermine the public perception of legislative integrity and
the right of the citizenry to honest representation.'27 The only reason
120. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 56 (1948); see Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) ("We must think things not words ...").
121. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NoTicEs, LETTERS AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 141 (Schriver Ed. 1936). Cf. Hollen v. Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522, 526 (7th
Cir. 1972)(Stevens, J.)("logic dictates that we should not close our eyes in the face of extrinsic
evidence which reveals that an appearance of official business is nothing more than a mask
for private purpose").
122. United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S.
(1979). Since the Gillock trial has not proceeded at the time of this article, the textual
reference is not intended to give the grand jury's probable cause finding more weight than it
deserves.
123. Id.
124. United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 924
(1978).
125. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976). The
nature of the scheme is more fully set forth in the subsequent appeal from the conviction of
two legislators on the merits. See United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1978). The
court acknowledged that the case involved a "fetcher" bill-"A bill introduced by legislators
for purposes of extracting money from an industry." Id. at 515 n.1. See also United States v.
Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977)(more pervasive scheme of legislative corruption eminating
from same investigation).
126. The phenomenon is not new. See Chicago Daily News, Oct. 9, 1882 ("When I want
to buy up any politicians I always find the anti-monopolists the most purchaseable. They
don't come so high.")(comments of William H. Vanderbilt).
127. Considerations of this nature motivated the Chief Justice to issue the following
comments in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1972):
[Tihe purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect the individual
legislator, not simply for his own sake, but to preserve the independence and
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that might legitimately allow the courts to overlook these considera-
tions is a truly compelling concern for the principles of federalism.
2. Federalism
The courts that have recognized the privilege have paid consider-
able deference to the principles of federalism in reaching their
conclusions. Relying upon Younger v. Harris,2 8 they have found
the privilege necessary to promote a proper respect for state func-
tions.'2
Reliance upon Younger in this context represents a cogent ex-
ample of "the domino method of constitutional adjudication . . .
wherein every explanatory statement in a previous opinion is made
the basis for extension to a wholly different situation."' 30 Younger
and its progeny, exhibiting the Supreme Court's solicitude for the
states' interests in their judicial and prosecutorial functions, have
insulated state prosecutions from federal injunctive or declaratory
intervention in the absence of bad faith.131
However, a refusal to recognize a federal speech or debate privi-
lege would do nothing to intrude upon the freedom of the states to
deal with local political corruption. It may well be that the primary
responsibility for ferreting out their political corruption must rest
with the state, which is the most directly involved political unit. 32
But resource limitations, on overwhelming public concern for the
prosecution of violent crime, and the bold specter of local political
influence, have combined to prevent the states from effectively
dealing with crimes in public office. Thus, although free to bring
prosecutions as they choose, state prosecutors have welcomed fed-
thereby the integrity of the legislative process. But financial abuses by way of
bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, would gravely undermine legisla-
tive integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation. Depriving
the Executive of the power to investigate and prosecute and the Judiciary of the
power to punish bribery of Members of Congress is unlikely to enhance legislative
independence.
128. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court indicated that the concept of federalism represents
"a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. at 44.
129. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976). Contra United States
v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
130. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CA IF. L. Rev. 929,
950 (1965).
131. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Perez v. Ledesman, 401 U.S. 82 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
132. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 779 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976).
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eral intervention insofar as the prosecution of public officials is
involved. ,3
The federalism argument may have credence in a dispute con-
cerning the overextension of federal jurisdiction to reach conduct
uniquely within the concern of local criminal laws. But it is too late
in the day to argue that federal criminal jurisdiction does not extend
to local political corruption,' 3' and that very argument was rejected
by the courts that recognized the privilege.' 35 In light of the prosecu-
tion's legitimacy, the federal intrusion is too attenuated to support
the creation of a privilege. Nothing in the Younger line of cases
suggests that the principles of federalism should be invoked to cre-
ate an evidentiary privilege designed to inhibit a prosecution which
does not intrude upon those very same principles.' 36
Moreover, in the context of federal prosecution of local corrup-
tion, the principles of federalism should be used as a sword rather
than a shield. Sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both state
and federal governments is not diminished by federal prosecutions
of local officials. The federal government has an obligation to assure
that its citizens, in their dual capacity as state citizens, are provided
with a state government in which official activities are conducted
133. See Comment, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce
Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 80 [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause]:
[Ilt should be noted that the use of the commerce clause as an expansive basis
for federal intervention in the area of crime control has not been opposed by the
states, though similar federal intervention in economic affairs faced heavy resist-
ance. State acquiescence, if not encouragement, can be attributed to several fac-
tors: the federal government has not preempted state powers; federal intervention
has helped states deal with problems serious enough to override the usual states'
rights fears; and the federal government has entered this area gradually, reluc-
tantly, and primarily with programs aimed at organized crime, a problem generally
felt to be incapable of solution by the states acting alone.
Id. at 822.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1976); United States v. Issacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 554 (1941). See generally Stern,
Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SEATON HALL L. REv. 1 (1973); Jurisdiction Under the
Commerce Clause, supra note 133, at 824.
135. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1977)(the criminal
statutes forming the basis of the grand jury investigation do not pose "a substantial interfer-
ence with state functions in the context of this case"); United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773,
779 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976) ("[I1t is within the province of the United
States Attorney to prosecute local officials who violate federal law .... ").
136. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 (1974) (Rhenquist, concurring) ("Those
decisions . . . depended upon considerations relevant to the harmonious operation of sepa-
rate federal and state court systems, with a special regard for the state's interest in enforcing
its own criminal law .... ").
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in accordance with the law. State prosecuting authorities, due to
their acknowledged difficulties in dealing with local political cor-
ruption, have gladly deferred cases of this nature to federal prosecu-
tion. Consequently, there has been no intrusion on legitimate state
interests. Further, the goals of federalism can be frustrated by the
creation of a privilege which erodes the ability of federal prosecutors
to provide their state counterparts with welcomed assistance in
dealing with crimes by political officials. When so viewed, there is
nothing in the federal-state relationship that pre-empts the govern-
ment's need of evidence of federal crime.' 37
THE MODERN STATE LEGISLATURE
As indicated at the outset, the need for a speech or debate privi-
lege for state legislators has turned upon a particular judge's percep-
tion of the legislative process. The judges who have accepted the
privilege have viewed it as a necessary bulwark for an effective and
uninhibited state legislature;'1 those who have rejected it have con-
cluded that the nature of our political system makes the federal
threat to the state legislative process remote.' 31 Underlying these
divergent positions is the particular judge's intuitive recognition of
the operations of the modern state legislature.
During the past twenty years, legislative strength and independ-
ence has increased and state legislatures have improved.4 0 Whereas
legislators were once left to their own devices, they now have consid-
erable support services, particularly through the addition of profes-
sional staffs. Modernization of the legislative process through stand-
ing committees and open public hearings has increased public par-
ticipation and understanding. The part-time citizen legislature has,
in recent years, given way to a system which provides greater com-
pensation and enables members to spend more time in session and
interim work.
These developments have provided the contemporary legislator
with a heightened capability to review and analyze pending legisla-
tion. As a result, the high turnover that has historically plagued the
legislative process is beginning to decline as more and more quali-
137. United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
924 (1978).
138. See text accompanying notes 11, 17, and 26 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 13, 20, and 28 supra.
140. Pound & Tubbesing, The State Legislatures, in THE BOOK OF STATES 1978-1979 1
(Council of State Government 1979) [hereinafter cited as Pound & Tubbesing]; see Kurfess,
State Legislatures: A Record of Accomplishment, 47 ST. GvT. 247 (1974). See generally S.
WELCH & J. PETERS, THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATE REFORM (1977); Karnis & Siselman, State
Legislative Reform and Public Policy: Another Look, 1975 W. POL. Q. 548.
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fied citizens become attracted to legislative service.' In related
developments, the trend toward open government, prompted by
Watergate, has reached new heights. Economic disclosure laws and
lobbyist regulation have been tightened' and restrictions on cam-
paign financing have increased dramatically.'
The practical impact of these beneficent alterations in the process
has resulted in individual legislators who are better qualified, more
knowledgeable, and far more independent than their predecessors.
Professional staff and time for analysis make it unnecessary to place
undue reliance upon lobbyists to understand the merits of a bill.
Campaign financing is no longer cloaked in the shroud of secrecy
that once led to unwarranted speculation. Public participation in
the process, through committee testimony, has led to a better com-
prehension of constituent positions.
In light of the manner in which the modern legislature operates,
it is highly doubtful that the threat of federal prosecution looms as
a serious inhibition. Contemporary legislators support or oppose
matters for articulated reasons and can point to staff analysis or
constituent material or investigative research to document their
positions. It strains credulity to assume that a legislator in today's
society will take a position because he or she fears federal prosecut-
ing authorities.
As the cases make clear, the modern legislature is not free from
corruption. If the courts were to grant each of the 7,562 state legisla-
tors in this country' a judicially created evidentiary privilege
(which honest members do not need and dishonest ones can use to
transform their public positions into "vendible commodities") con-
fidence in the legislative process will diminish.' Such a result
141. See Rosenthal, And So They Leave, 47 ST. GvT. 149 (1974).
142. See Knapp, Trends in State Legislation: 1976-1977, in THE BOOK OF STATES, supra
note 140, at 215.
143. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND REALITY IN THE STATES
(1976); Claggett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath and its Prospects: The Constitu-
tionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1328
(1976); Cockrell, Campaign Finance Reform-Pollution Control For Smoke Filled Rooms, 48
FORENSIC Q. 504 (1975).
144. See Pound & Tubbesing, supra note 140, at 13. The number is as of January, 1978.
145. See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 295 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, - U.S. - (1979):
It is not unreasonable to believe that public confidence in the administration of
justice in the federal courts will be undermined if state legislators are permitted to
violate, with impunity, the criminal statutes of the United States because of a
court-created special privilege in their favor, but not in favor of any other person,
which privilege results in the suppression of relevant and material evidence of the
criminal conduct of the state legislators.
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would seriously erode the gains that modem legislatures have made.
Thus, it is clear that the judges who have rcognized the speech
or debate privilege because they perceived a nbed to protect the
legislative process from outside intrusion have genuinely underesti-
mated the strength and independence of the modem legislature.
The road that legislative leaders have traveled to reach this level has
not been an easy one. A judicial decision that operated to shield a
few guilty members without benefit to the great majority of honest
and conscientious ones would cause a substantial retreat along that
road.
CONCLUSION
When the speech or debate cloak is removed from consideration,
the legal issues to be determined in connection with the state legis-
lator's privilege fall within the framework of two previously decided
Supreme Court cases.
The secrecy and inaccessibility of the deliberative process and the
motives of jurors have remained, from their common law underpin-
nings, significant aspects of the jury system. In Clark v. United
States,' however, Mr. Justice Cardozo recognized that, although
freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought
checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots
were to be freely published to the world,'47 the juror's privilege is not
without exception. Accordingly, the Court held that evidence of a
juror's conduct during deliberations may be admitted to prove that
she engaged in contempt by committing perjury during the voir
dire. In dictum, the Court posed an example that has acute relev-
ance to the instant situation:
Let us assume for illustration a prosecution for bribery. Let us
assume that there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, that money
has been paid to a juror in consideration of his vote. The argument
for the petitioner, if accepted, would bring us to a holding that the
case for the People must go to the triers of the facts without proof
that the vote has been responsible to the bribe. This is paying too
high a price for the assurance to a juror of serenity of mind.1'4
In United States v. Nixon,4 l the Court relied heavily upon the
Although Judge Weick articulated his concern in terms of public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice, the argument applies with equal, if not greater, force to public confidence
in the legislative process.
146. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id. at 14.
149. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Clark analysis to conclude that presidential communications are
not insulated from the criminal process. By inserting a few words
relevant to state legislators in place of those used by the Court with
respect to the President, the controlling nature of the Nixon opinion
becomes clear:
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privi-
lege of confidentiality of [speech or debate] in performance of the
[state legislator's] responsibilities against the inroads of such a
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. The inter-
est in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled
to great respect. However, we cannot conclude that [state legisla-
tors] will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the
infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that
such conversations will be called for in the context of q criminal
prosecution.o10
In the absence of a constitutional mandate, the need for a speech
or debate privilege is no different than the need for a juror's privilege
or a presidential privilege. The competing policy considerations,
pitting the need for uninhibited communication against the de-
mands of the criminal law, are the same.
When the historical underpinnings of the constitutional speech or
debate principle are examined in the light of reason and experience,
there is no justification for a judicially-created evidentiary privilege
to protect state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions. The
courts that have allowed the use of evidence of official acts have
done no more than "manifest their general impatience with legal-
isms, with dry and sterile dogma, and with virtually unfounded
assumptions which served to insulate the law and the Constitution
it serves from the hard world it is intended to affect."' 5'
150. Id. at 711-12 (footnotes omitted).
151. A.Goldberg, Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court 25 (1971 Rosen-
thal Lectures; Northwestern University School of Law).
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